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WILD CARDS, WEAK SIGNALS AND ORGANIZATIONAL IMPROVISATION  
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper addresses the need for reliable action guidelines that can be used by organisations in 
turbulent environments. Building on current conceptual and empirical research, we suggest an 
analytical approach for the management of surprising and potentially damaging events. In order to 
do so we use the wild card management system. Wild cards refer to sudden and unique incidents 
that can constitute turning points in the evolution of a certain trend or system. As the first of the two 
components of such a wild card system we advocate a weak signal methodology to take into 
account those wild cards that can be anticipated by scanning the decision environment. The second 
component, the nurture of improvisation capabilities, is designed to deal with ongoing crisis. This 
paper can be seen as part of a broader agenda on how to manage in conditions of continuous but 
unpredictable change. 
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1. Introduction*  
Usually the most challenging issue in foresight/futures studies is wild card analysis. A wild card is a 
description of an occurrence that is assumed to be improbable, but which would have large and 
immediate consequences for organisational stakeholders if it takes place. Usually such events are 
serious, destructive, catastrophic or anomalous and essentially not predictable. Furthermore, if 
such an occurrence takes place so quickly and powerfully that a normal, planned management 
process cannot make allowance for it, then the organization will be especially vulnerable. To be 
sure, it is also clear that a wild card, if it does not give the organization any possibility of reaction, is 
irrelevant in practical terms. Consider for instance the extreme example of a meteor hitting the 
Earth. This is an occurrence which is not easily introduced as input into a conventional (or 
unconventional) corporate planning process. The spectre of conceivable wild cards is infinitely 
wide, containing many events that the organization cannot ignore without cost. Likewise, there is a 
great need for basic understanding and practical approaches that can be used by organizations in 
turbulent and unforgiving environments in which unique and sudden events can happen.  
 
The discussion of wild cards seems suited to ignite the “strategic conversation” (Van der Heijeden) 
exactly where it is mostly needed. Often, hasted actions by senior executives contribute to amplify 
the seriousness of the problems and heighten the public controversy created around the company. 
Examples include Royal Dutch/Shell being completely taken by surprise by the Greenpeace 
                                                 
* The order of author’s names does not represent any order of seniority. It reflects sequence in which we 
entered in this project. Future collaborations will witness a rotation in our names. We wish to acknowledge the 
comments of Jill Shepherd and Haridimos Tsoukas and the participants at “Probing the Future” conference at 
the University of Strathclyde. We also appreciated the opportunity to present our views on wild cards in the 
European Environmental Agency and wish to thank Teresa Ribeiro and Sofia Vaz. The responsibility for any 
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campaign against sinking the Brent Spar oil platform, Daimler and the A Class Series road-test 
accidents, and, more recently, Ford and the Firestone tyre trouble. Therefore, tactics do matter. 
Doing too little too late and loosing control of the situation can significantly damage the 
organisation, especially when information flows rapidly through the media and the Internet. For 
these reasons, conceptual analysis of discontinuities is important, empirical evidence is fleeting and 
policy recommendations urgent. Up to now, research into this problem has been ad-hoc. 
 
This paper addresses the need for reliable action guidelines that can be used by organizations in 
rapidly changing environments. In order to do so we develop a wild card management system, 
based upon two components: weak signals and organizational improvisation. As the first 
component we advocate a weak signal methodology in order to take into account those wild cards 
that can be anticipated by scanning the environment. As the second component, we discuss how 
improvisation can be used to deal with those events that have not been anticipated and prevented. 
This foresight practice can create a broadly consistent set of values and orienting principles of (re-
)action allowing for a decentralized, coherent approach to technology, marketing and public 
relations challenges that come unannounced by weak signals.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. We first present a definition and a classification system for wild 
cards. Next, we describe the role of weak signal detection in the wild card system. The following 
section discusses the possible contributions of improvisation to organizational foresight and its 
articulation with the wild card and weak signal topics.       
 
                                                                                                                                                
errors and mistakes is ours. Miguel Pina e Cunha gratefully acknowledges support from Instituto Nova Forum.  
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2. Making sense of wild cards  
 
In this section we tackle the basic definitional issues of wild cards and underline their importance 
for management. We proceed to establish the first component of the wild card system, which is an 
early warning environmental device based in the imaginability, substance and impact of potential 
wild cards. 
 
 
2.1 What are wild cards? 
 
 
Wild cards refer to incidents with perceived low probability of occurrence but with potentially high 
impacts for an organization. Events like September 11th are such wild cards. These sudden and 
unique incidents can constitute turning points in the evolution of a certain trend or system. Wild 
cards can become plausible at any time and are one of the most unpredictable and potentially 
damaging triggers of change of four conceivable components of change: trends, cycles, emerging 
issues, and wild cards. A multiplicity of unconnected contributions to research on this topic has 
produced a long list of labels such as disruptive events, structural breaks, discontinuities, surprises, 
bifurcations, unprecedented developments, etc. Here we stick to terminology originally introduced 
by Rockfellow (1994), so we use the term “wild cards”. 
  
Wild cards have a direct effect on the human condition, have broad and sometimes fundamental 
implications, and tend to move too fast for the whole of the system to adjust to the shock 
(Petersen 1999: 17). These systemic breaks emerge from a variety of interlinked variables, which 
produce no obvious effect until a threshold of some kind is met. Wild cards can be regarded as 
single watershed events in history, like the end of an era, or a paradigm shift. The fall of the Berlin 
Wall is a perfect example of a wild card event. After a wild card watershed, disequilibria reigns 
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until the affected system reorganizes and establishes a new equilibrium. The two Germanies are still 
in the process of getting back to a cohesive larger political and economic system. Other examples, 
imaginable future wild cards, may include a major stock market financial crash (larger than 1987), 
the implementation of the Tobin-tax, a nuclear disaster in Russia (larger than Chernobyl), the flop 
of the new European currency, a civil war in the USA, a coup d’Etat in China, or a new disease 
that kills more than 500,000 people in a country, etc.  
 
The core characteristics of wild cards are low probability (or high uncertainty if probability 
assessments can not be given) and high impact. However, the effects of a wild card do not have to 
be abrupt in time. By the last point it is meant that time to impact (and damage) can be long or 
short. A current example is climate change possibly induced by carbondioxide emissions. This is a 
wild card which could emerge slowly over time but with irreversible consequences. This justifies a 
bias for action in dealing with wild cards. Indeed, waiting for more and better information on what 
is going on might be as costly as making a wrong decision in response to an hazardous event given 
that, as time passes, exposure to harm increases. As John Maynard Keynes once put it, “we may 
never know enough to take the chance worth taking”. 
 
2.2 Are wild cards important? 
 
In a strategic planning process one can ask three questions with respect to wild cards (Petersen 
1999: 16): which are the most important Wild cards for an organization? Can we anticipate their 
arrival? Is there anything we can do about them? If managers can answer these three questions, 
wild card analysis increases the possibility that some major future negative events might be averted 
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or moderated, but also positive actions can be implemented. Since wild cards are, by definition, 
surprises, it might be assumed that there is nothing we can know or do about them. However, this 
is not so: not all wild cards are unimaginable. Moreover, if information about likely direct and 
indirect effects on a company is to be appraised by watching for weak signals that anticipate wild 
cards, realistic measures can be thought of in order to reduce the drastic consequences of major 
wild cards. Managers can find help to answer Petersen’s three questions if they prepare to make 
sense of the environment ex-ante. Wild card analysis increases the probability that some major 
future negative events might be averted, but also positive actions can be implemented. If we neither 
take time to look at them nor consider how they might be anticipated, they are guaranteed to catch 
us off our guard. The challenge is therefore in designing a special kind of foresight methodology 
that keeps the wild card debate alive, allowing room for interactive learning and the development 
of anticipatory attitudes.  
 
A consequence of not accounting for wild cards from the beginning of the management process is 
to loose time in un-prepared crisis management when they happen (see e.g. Mitroff et al.1996; 
Mitroff and Pearson 1993; Mitroff and Anagnos 2000; Reid 2000). As shown in figure 1, when a 
proper wild card system is installed, time used in crisis management decreases with time giving 
room to other types of managerial tasks such as operational, strategic and visionary management. 
If the company is not able to promptly neutralize or adapt to wild cards it risks facing an 
accumulation of problems that demand an increasing commitment of managerial problem-solving 
capabilities to short-tem crisis situations. This helps to make the point that wild card management is 
highly complementary with other kinds of managerial styles, potentially increasing the effectiveness 
of the latter. 
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(Figure 1 about here) 
 
Related to this time management issues, another consequence of not having a wild card system in 
place is a higher probability of choosing a wrong action, or complete inaction. When under 
pressure, the wrong re-action might increase the damages of the original wild cards themselves. If  
(flexible) contingency plans are formulated and taken seriously, especially those that relate with 
developing organizational improvisation capabilities, as we shall argue below, there can be a sense 
of calm and orderliness when dramatic events eventually strike. Managers there, as well as their 
teams, will go about their jobs as though some civil defence operation for which they had already 
practiced. This stands in contrast with the sense of shock and panic reaction observed in other 
organizations where hasty and erroneous decisions will have more probability of being made. That 
is why in a period of exponential change and tight time budgets, it seems prudent to investigate the 
concept of wild cards and formulate policies that take them into account. Such an investigation 
would increase the possibility that some major future negative events might be averted or mitigated. 
  
 
3 Preparing for wild cards: The weak signal sub-system 
 
This section explores how practical knowledge about wild cards can be developed. It starts by 
discussing what is meant by weak signal and goes on to put forward a new environmental scanning 
tool. It then discusses the uses of the tool in the organisation. 
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3.1 What are weak signals? 
 
 
The concept of weak signal is used widely in the business literature, but the exact definition of what 
is actually meant is difficult to find. Usually weak signals are seen as information on potential 
change of a system to an unknown direction. The crisis management literature has repeatedly 
noticed the fact that “long before its actual occurrence a crisis sends off a repeated and persistent 
trail of early warning signals” (Mitroff 1988: 18).  According to our view, the concept of weak 
signal analysis is basically information on the likelihood of events whose probability is estimated to 
be very low but to which is attached a high uncertainty concerning the impact of those events and 
the trends that can develop afterwards, if any. Coffman (1997) has defined weak signals in a way 
that is compatible with our view of weak signals as indicators of wild cards. In summary a wild 
card is: 
 
1. An idea or a trend that will affect the business or business environment; 
2. New and surprising from the signals receiver’s vantage point; 
3. Sometimes difficult to track down amid other noise and signals; 
4. A threat or opportunity to an organization;  
5.  Often scoffed by other people who “know”; 
6. Has substantial lag time before maturing and become mainstream; and  
7. Represents a chance to learn, grow and evolve. 
 
 
The pioneer of weak signal analysis development has been Igor Ansoff (1982), who defined weak 
signals as external (e.g. quality of the work of suppliers is getting worse) or internal (e.g. increase 
or decrease of absence of the personnel) warnings that are too incomplete to permit an accurate 
estimation of their impact, and/or to determine a complete response. Ansoff suggested that every 
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event goes through a succession of levels of knowledge (from weak signal to strong signal). 
Usually a sense of environmental turbulence is the earliest identification of the signal. In this 
condition, the environment is expected to generate novelties but it is impossible to say where the 
important event will originate. The second phase is that the source of the challenge is known. In 
third phase shape of the challenge becomes concrete. For instance, in the technological area this 
kind of phase happens when a first prototype of new technology is constructed. At the stage when 
a weak signal becomes a strong signal organizations are likely to develop response strategies. In 
the final phase the outcome of response strategies becomes forecastable. In this phase we can use 
traditional forecasting methods (see e.g. Makridakis and Wheelwright 1989, Armstrong 2001). 
We propose that wild card analysis can be introduced in standard foresight exercises through a 
weak signal scanning device. 
 
3.2 How can weak signals be interpreted? 
 
In the field of business oriented futures studies there is a long tradition of environmental scanning 
methodologies, which aim to serve the need of weak signal analysis (see e.g. Preble and Reichel 
1988; Thomas 1990; Renfro 1993). Following our concern with wild cards we propose a 
scanning methodology based on the integration of three analytical components: the imaginability, 
substance and impact classifications. The first is a “surprise metrics” by which we can be used to 
categorize information leading to potential wild cards. The notion of “surprise” is negatively 
correlated with the ability of correctly detecting the weak signals.  
 
i) as unimaginable surprises (like a journey to the Earth’s centre at the time of Jules 
Verne),  
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ii) imaginable surprises that are improbable (like a global nuclear war),  
iii) imaginable surprises that are probable (like an oil price shock and an invasion of 
ecological refugees), and  
iv) certain surprises (like earthquakes).  
 
The second analytical device is based on the observation that wild cards can be further categorized 
by substantive themes. Surprises can be distributed in the wild card space according to the PESTE 
framework, a classic subject checklist for monitoring external trends and shocks: Political-military 
factors, Economic factors, Social factors, Technological factors, and Environmental factors (see 
e.g. Meristö 1991).  
 
Thirdly, and finally, we can still classify the nature and magnitude of impact of wild cards, thus 
completing the ISI matrix shown in table 1. Figure 2 describes a classification of wild cards, which 
we can expect to happen, when we observe phenomena that can be described by trends.  An 
essential feature of a wild card is that it usually breaks the expected long-run trend. The 
formulation of a typology of impacts enables an assessment of the stability and sensitivity of 
scenarios and trends. A break of trend can be the result of:  
(1) Dead end type of wild card (DE);  
(2) Slow dead end type of wild card (SDE); 
(3) Dead end with a recovery to trend line (DERT); 
(4) Push up to positive direction type of wild card (PUP); and 
(5) Slow push up to positive direction type of wild card (SPUP);  
 
(Figure 2 about here) 
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This analytical device tackles the type of the impact a wild card could have on an organization. 
However, this categorisation of impacts should also be interpreted in terms of scope to facilitate 
the quick understanding of possible consequences if a wild card occurs. Depending on the wild 
card the type and scope of impact can be very varied. Some wild cards like a financial crash may 
have an impact on all functional units and locations of an organisation, e.g. on the headquarter, all 
production facilities and all functional units. At the same time this wild card may entail serious 
financial losses but not necessarily other types of losses, e.g. an image crisis. Other wild cards, like 
a local environment hazard, may have a very specific impact on an organization. From a managerial 
perspective it is vital to perform an “impact mapping”, which guides strategic and improvisational 
action. The categories used for differentiating scope and type of impact depend on the respective 
context of the organization and one of the first steps in wild card management should be the 
identification of the relevant categories (e.g. financial losses, human resource impacts, image 
impacts). This perspective implies the formulation of comments for each impact that deal directly 
with the field of action and improvisation. What does it mean for managers? In large organizations 
the locus of improvisation is always “local”, meaning in certain parts of the organization. There are 
only few wild cards in which whole organizations are hit in all dimensions. Mostly the impacts can 
be specified in terms of organizational type and scope of impact. This is a dimension in which 
management is mostly interested, because all improvisation has to take scope and type of the 
internal impacts of the external events into account. 
 
Finally, an integrated approach to potential wild cards can be used as a starting point in the 
mapping of “weak signals”, whose analysis helps the wild card identification process in real time. 
Table 1 condenses these scanning tools into an integrated scanning system that might be called 
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Imaginability-Subject-Impact (ISI) matrix. This scanning device can be easily inserted in standard 
scenario projects as way of taking into account potential wild cards. 
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
3.3 Debating wild cards inside the organisation 
 
It is now important to make a clear difference between the concept of “weak signal” and the 
concept of “wild card”. Theoretically speaking, weak signals are scattered data that point to the 
eminence of potential wild card events to the decision-makers. Usually there is an abundance of 
weak signals “in the air” before a wild card event happens. Weak signals cannot be easily 
connected to current trends and well-defined risk analysis. It is also possible that a weak signal 
remains a weak signal, not all weak signals are going to become strong signals. However, weak 
signals are perceived symptoms of changes in the environment.  Tracking weak signals can be a 
task of an external and internal scanning procedure carried out typically by the strategic planning or 
marketing departments of an organization. When it is understood that not all weak signals are going 
to be strong signals the essentially subjective nature of what are the potential wild cards that weak 
signals may be denouncing becomes explicit. The concept of “wild card” is a culturally embedded 
one in the sense that we can always note that some things are real surprises to some certain groups 
and some individuals. Some people are not surprised if they have observed weak signals and have 
drawn some conclusions concerning weak signals. That means that agents are usually too 
pessimistic or too optimistic in relation to real wild cards. That is why it is rational to make 
foresight exercises to debate wild cards when agents are rationally bounded. The objective of 
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foresight methodologies is to allow a convergence of the belief in subjective probabilities held by 
different individuals by criss-crossing the variety of their personal views. The end result of this 
conversation is that overall subjective probability should get closer and closer with the real 
probabilities of the external world, i.e. a learning process. 
 
Conceptually speaking, foresight systems (trend analysis, scenario analysis, weak signal analysis) 
can be seen as a part of organizational intelligence, which serves knowledge creation in an 
organization. Typical aspects, which are relevant for the futures oriented decision-making, are 
probability, feasibility, desirability and validity (see e.g. Amara 1981; Rubin and Kaivo-oja 1999). 
And this is the link between positive knowledge and normative intent. Knowledge increases the 
capability to mobilize attention and effort within the organization and, in the end, the ability to 
undertake correct actions.  
 
In our case, and specifically building on the weak signal approach, a list of proposals can be 
derived to answer questions about what policies could be put in place in order to manage the 
unforeseen events, the desirability of these measures and the degree of belief in their effectiveness. 
Deriving concrete policy measures from wild cards and their possible meanings in terms of type 
and scope of impact is key to link the wild card system to concrete action. When a list of wild 
cards is identified and interpreted they serve as a basis on which conscious decision of action (or 
inaction) be made. The probability that a true wild card appearing in the ISI matrix can approach 
zero, however, the process of building such a list of wild cards is not neutral for the future. Listed 
wild cards, inferred from weak signal monitoring, can provide the basic notes and chords for real-
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time decisional innovation, i.e., improvisation. When a decision is to be made, the practice of 
improvisation, which relies on a bias for action, can be helpful.  
 
To summarize, wild cards can be categorised even though they cannot be known. Once wild card 
categories are fixed as in the ISI classification system, weak signals can be monitored and 
prepared against. To be sure, not all of them turn out to be wild cards. However, it is because 
some wild cards can be mediated by weak signals that this early warning framework should be the 
first component of wild card management system. It is also true that there are wild cards that are 
unannounced by weak signals and that our wild card management system would be necessarily 
incomplete if one stopped here. Organizations need some kind of structure that allows them to 
manage wild cards in real time. In the next section, we present an illustration of why futures 
research supplies a structure for social interaction that is both creative and flexible enough to 
generate a diversified set of ideas that lead to the analysis of wild cards. This section will provide a 
vivid context after which we will discuss the potential of foresight, not only in the analysis of wild 
cards, but also in providing the basis for the real-time management of wild cards when they 
happen. 
 
4. Socio-technology for improvisation: Conditions for real time foresight 
 
This section argues that the practice of scenario planning not only is most suited for carrying out a 
strategic debate around potential wild cards, but also constitutes a key ingredient for managing 
wild cards when they really happen. Foresight activities may be combined with organisational 
structures intended to build and spread improvisational capabilities throughout the organisation. 
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The practice of foresight provides the infrastructure for improvisation, which will help to create the 
elements for the second component of the wild card management system. 
 
4.1 The role of organizational improvisation 
 
This section introduces the notion of organizational improvisation and its role in helping the 
organization in the task of creating the resilience necessary to deal with unexpected events, like 
those considered by wild cards. Improvisational capabilities, as growing research evidence 
suggests (Kamoche et al. 2002), can be introduced in the field of organizational foresight in order 
to complement attempts of anticipation. If the monitoring of weak signals, discussed in the previous 
section, does not prove to be enough to prevent a crisis from happening, improvisational 
capabilities may be necessary for dealing with an ongoing crisis. Below we discuss the concept of 
organizational improvisation and its potential contribution to the field of crisis management. 
 
Organizational improvisation refers to the convergence of conception and execution (Cunha et al. 
1999; Miner et al. 2001). In practice, improvisation is said to exist when deliberate but unplanned 
actions are executed, aiming to help the organization in its effort of responding to unforeseen 
opportunities or threats in an environment under perpetual change. We argue that improvisation 
may also be a relevant concept for the field of futures studies due to the following reasons: (1) it is 
not possible for all crises to be averted; (2) crisis management systems teach the organization, in 
advance and in a general way, how to combat a potential crisis; (3) however, every crisis develops 
in a unique way and thus needs to be dealt with accordingly; (4) the lack of detail of crisis 
management plans needs to be complemented with action based on local knowledge, acquired and 
processed on the spot – in other words, via improvisational abilities.                  
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Improvisation per se is also not enough to deal with wild card situations: planning is obviously 
necessary. Thus we agree with Mitroff (1988: 15) when saying that “clearly, it would be the height 
of folly not to plan for the occurrence of at least one major disaster.” In fact, that is what the first 
component of our wild card system is all about: identifying weak signals and preparing preliminary 
action guidelines. However, even wild-card scenario planning, will not prevent every crisis from 
happening. Improvisational capabilities may be especially necessary when confronting issues such 
as the public failure of a new technology or the notorious defect of a highly visible new product, an 
environmental crisis, and so forth.  
 
 
Authors on the crisis management field have aptly noted that it is nearly impossible to invent crisis 
management mechanisms on the spot, while the crisis is taking place (Mitroff 1988). This indicated 
that improvisation can not be thought of as the way of managing a crisis. They also noted, 
however, that remaining loyal to planned actions that have become inadequate in face of local 
circumstances, may be dangerous. Weick’s (1993) analysis of the Mann Gulch fire showed that 
fire-fighters that “followed the plan” were killed, while those that have dropped their tools- 
something against the plan – have survived. Putting these arguments together it is possible to 
suggest that organizations need plans but must be aware that these plans should be confronted with 
and accommodated to local circumstances.  
 
Improvisation has been shown to be helpful in times of crisis, by allowing people to complement 
general plans with locally sensitive practices. An illustration of how structure and improvisation can 
be coupled to deal more effectively with crisis situations is provided by Roberts and her colleagues 
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(Bigley and Roberts 2001; Grabowski and Roberts 1999). These authors report how the incident 
command system ripes the benefits of bureaucracy (e.g. control and efficiency), while avoiding this 
format’s tendency toward inertia. The incident command system (ICS) is an approach used by 
USA public safety organizations (e.g. police, firefighters) that assembles and controls the 
temporary systems needed to manage people and equipment at a wide range of emergencies. It is 
a highly structured and formalized system, characterized by extensive rules, procedures, policies 
and instructions. Jobs are specialized and based upon standard routines. Positions are 
hierarchically related. Plans are established at the top of the hierarchy. Yet the system is highly 
flexible: rules are needed to create a reliable organization, which must be ready to act expeditiously 
and according to the crisis requirements. For example, the incident commander comes from the 
first unit to arrive at the scene, regardless of who arrives first. The system is also prepared to shift 
roles, as for example when a more experienced person arrives, and to migrate authority to where 
expertise resides. In sum, the ICS is a highly flexible social system where the organisation’s profile 
alters rapidly (e.g. role switching, authority migration) and the violation of standard operating 
procedures is acceptable if procedures do not fit the characteristics of the situation. Here Bigley 
and Roberts (2001) make a distinction between legitimate improvisation (that they define as the 
application of novel tactics to unexpected problems in order to support ICS objectives) and 
illegitimate improvisation, or “freelancing” (that they define as behavior not directed towards the 
goals of the ICS). Freelancing is highly discouraged because it is potentially dangerous both for the 
freelancer and for the other members of the system: it is not predicted nor expected by anyone in 
the ICS. Coordination in the system is possible because highly sophisticated cognition management 
systems are constantly activated. Operational representations of the incident are developed on an 
ongoing basis. These representations are then intensely communicated throughout the system and 
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shared among its members. Representational responsibility guarantees that each member 
possesses the knowledge necessary to do his/her job in a proper manner. The incident commander 
is the person who attempts to maintain the “big picture” of the whole operation in order to ensure 
that updated mental models of the incident are distributed throughout the system as necessary.       
                     
    
Interestingly, most of the features of the ICS have been reported in other organizational contexts 
and processes. To illustrate the point with a few cases, it can be noted that Brown and Eisenhardt 
(1997) have shown, in a study with computer firms, that the same combination of structure and 
freedom is a major feature of the most adaptive firms. Adler, Goldoftas and Levine (1999) 
identified the coexistence of bureaucracy and flexibility in the NUMMI automobile assembly plant. 
Brown and Eisenhardt (1997) identified intensive communication as fundamental for making sense 
of the software development process. Lanzara (2001) presented action and communication as 
critical coordinating mechanisms in temporary organizations (in the case the organization of a 
fashion show). This and other evidence suggests that improvisational capabilities may be a relevant 
component of flexible systems.         
 
When facing these unexpected events, companies should be able to develop expedite, vigorous 
and effective responses. However, due to organizational inertia (Hannan and Freeman 1977), 
defensive cultures (Argyris 1990), or some other source of passivity, they may not be able to deal 
with the situation in a quickly and effective manner. How to create an organisational basis for 
improvisation represents the core of the second component of wild card system that we present 
next. 
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4.2 The infrastructure for improvisation 
 
We are now to discuss the way in which improvisation can be used as a real-time response to 
unplanned-for events while they are unfolding. Improvisation rests on a couple of minimal 
structuring elements (Cunha et al.2001), of two types: organizational and process types. Minimal 
organizational structures refer to the context of improvisational action. Organizational elements 
include facilitation of emergent change, a “safe” climate for improvisation, diversity of skills and 
perspectives, locality, and a bias for action. The minimal process structure aims to reach the 
alignment of the means necessary for improvisation to take place. It includes storytelling, a 
perception of urgency, relevance, non-conformity, possibilities of rehearsal and the capability of 
rapidly re-combing previous knowledge and structure. These elements, which together enable the 
possibility of improvisation, make up the second component of the wild card managing system.    
 
The first element of the minimal organizational structure refers to emergence. Contrary to traditional 
planning practices, that ignored it, emergence is viewed in this case as an inevitable property of 
complex systems. This is in stark contrast with traditional management practices, which favoured 
predictability and top-driven change processes. In face of unpredictable events, however, 
following the rules may not be enough to solve problems. On the contrary, as demonstrated by 
Weick, following general and abstract rules, i.e. rules that are not adequate to local circumstances, 
may be a route to disaster (Weick 1993). Improvised behaviours, being locally sensitive, emerge 
according to the circumstances, and not independently of the circumstances. The role of weak 
signal analysis in our framework role is to appreciate the meaning of wild cards for the company’s 
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strategic trajectory and instil an awareness of a list of possibly appropriate policy responses. This 
strategic knowledge supplies a basis from which local interpretation and prompt re-action to of 
potential wild cards can emerge. 
 
A second crucial element for improvisation to occur is the existence of a “safe” environment. A 
“safe” environment here refers to the inevitability of errors as “failures of reach” and potential 
sources of learning (McGrath et al.1995). While planning in real-time, in order to deal with 
unexpected and novel events, individuals may feel confident enough to try out new solutions and 
untested ways of problem solving. Safe organizational environments are those that, to use the 
words of Weick (1999), appreciate the aesthetics of imperfection or, in other words, that 
understand that to learn is to err (Sitkin 1992). The third organizational element favouring 
improvisation is functional diversity as represented in cross-functional teams. Cross-functional 
teams help improvisation to flourish to the extent they facilitate constructive confrontation, deviate 
the group from routine behaviours, and invite their members to develop non-conventional problem-
solving. They should also have a bias for action, which is the fourth and final element in our action 
structure. As demonstrated by several authors (Weick 1995), action may be helpful while dealing 
with unexpected contingencies because it is instrumental for sense making and coordination. These, 
in turn, may lead to discovery and to real-time learning, which are relevant outcomes when facing 
unexpected events of the wild card genre.     
 
Elements in the process structure include the means needed to assure that the organization has the 
capacity to put improvisational scenario planning into practice. We suggest that an important 
process is the storytelling element that is practiced with scenario methodologies. Stories may be 
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instrumental for improvisation if they show individuals that analytical, fact-based thinking is not the 
only legitimate form of thinking in the organization. Stories of successful improvisations may diffuse 
the perception that effortful, intentional responses to events are not only legitimate but also 
valuable. The potential of storytelling as a means of cultural transmission has been made clear in 
previous research (e.g. Martin and Powers 1981), and should be considered while preparing an 
organization to “fight fires”. A second element in the process structure is urgency. Without urgency, 
people will probably revert to planned solutions. One important function of leadership in face of 
wild cards is precisely to transmit a sense of urgency. Cunha, Cunha and Kamoche (in press) have 
empirically found that, without a perception of urgency, the probability of improvised behaviours 
diminishes. The perception of urgency naturally arises when improvisational scenarios are built 
around key uncertainties. Therefore, improvisation will appear as a response to important and 
pressing events. When these two conditions are met, people can be expected to plan in real time 
or, to recur to the definition of Moorman et al. (2001), to make conception and execution 
converge in time. This convergence is of central importance for preparing an organizational to deal 
with wild card type events. Another element of the process structure is non-conformity. 
Considering the disruptive nature of wild card events, people should be prepared to challenge 
conventional views and/or practices. As such, some organizational culture types, especially the 
hierarchical type (Deshpandé et al.1993), with its typical emphasis on obedience and conformity, 
may run against improvisation, and therefore against expedite action intended to deal with events of 
the wild card type. That is why the quest for flexibility requires the capability to integrate seemingly 
opposite approaches such as the capacity to protect stable structural elements (the bureaucratic 
infrastructure) while introducing behavioural variation (Volberda 1996; Kamoche & Cunha 2001). 
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4.3 Implications for management 
 
The explicit treatment of wild cards in foresight projects is critical for they pose radically engaging 
questions to the organisation as a whole. Remember that the first component of our wild card 
system advocates the analysis of weak signals and identifications of minimal action plans. Now, 
under the direct impact of a real wild card the previously stored information can be stored to 
supply an inspirational source for innovative reactions to the events. Now, it might be that wild 
cards, as suggested by weak signal perceptions, were frighteningly accurate or completely wrong 
in terms of what could happen. However, the anticipated wild cards, and the strategic meanings 
they immediately evoke, will give precious clues for making sense of what actually happened. For 
instance, if September 11th was not actually imagined then perhaps it could be though of being 
somewhere between a war in the Middle East and an earthquake in an important financial capital 
like Tokyo, two previously imagined wild cards that had been classified in the ISI matrix. Here one 
can go back to the stored wild card policy options depicted in table 2 and synthesize a mix of new 
policy implications that will constitute a first basis for decision. 
 
We submit that foresight is the appropriate socio-technology from which improvisation can emerge 
since it provides a minimal structure for coordination and real-time action. Elsewhere, (Mendonça 
2001), we defined socio-technology as a conception of an organisational structure that shapes 
interactive learning and sharing of understanding among the members of a collective body and, 
therefore, the learning and innovation capabilities of organisations. At the micro level it can refer to 
patterns of division of operational and cognitive labour in company whereas, at the macro level, it 
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can refer to societal institutions (Nelson and Sampat 2001). Socio-technologies define a 
framework for sense making and behaviour and, so as to be applicable in a range of specific 
situations and to meet a variety of specific needs Our suggestion to associate the term “socio-
technology” with “organisational foresight” has the objective of emphasizing that the structure in 
which people act and interact have a decisive connection with the performance of that social 
group. 
 
An important point for management is how to achieve the right balance between wild card analysis 
and organisational improvisation. We submit that the habit of managerial “assumption smashing” 
(Davis-Floyd 1997) instilled by foresight methodologies, such as scenarios or Delphi projects, is 
an important factor that facilitates the creation of organisational improvisational capabilities that 
allow the organisation to defuse or adapt to wild cards. Foresight forums provide a self-contained 
sphere where people from different backgrounds and organisational departments can pursue 
critical issues in a psychologically safe manner. By capturing the tacit knowledge embodied in 
diverse people inside the organization and by facilitating a rich process of debate, foresight 
techniques contribute to a creative atmosphere nurturing insights from where better-informed and 
innovative decisions can be drawn upon. The role of foresight in organisations can be seen as the 
activity of creative destruction, to use Schumpeter’s celebrated phrase, of habits of thought and 
decision-making routines within the organisation (Mendonça 2001). To summarise, implementing 
the two self-reinforcing wild card subsystems we propose in this paper might tune the organisation 
to the right music enabling a rapid and innovative response to the wild card challenge. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
 25
Contemporary organizational environments have been often described as turbulent and unforgiving 
(Harvey and Novicevic 2002). The uncertainty permeating them requires surprise-accommodating 
structures. This paper discussed the potential advantages resulting from the combination of two 
such approaches: wild cards analysis and organizational improvisation. This combination results 
from the assumption that companies should try to anticipate risky events, but need to do more: 
they have to prepare themselves to deal with these high risk/low probability events before and 
during their occurrence. With the idea of a wild card managing system, embedded in a foresight 
context, this paper suggested how to breed across an organization the skill to deal with events as 
they unfold. This capability of improvisation, or real-time planning is, we believe, a useful but 
neglected topic in the organizational foresight literature.  
 
We suggest a wild card system as a permanent process taking place in standard foresight 
exercises. It has a weak signal analysis component that aims to generate basic knowledge on 
potential crises. This knowledge on the strategic meaning of wild cards will provide the raw 
material for informed improvisation. It is the link between analysis and the improvisation 
infrastructure provided by the practice of foresight that enables the organisation to react influence 
the changes triggered by wild cards. This dynamic and ongoing view of foresight as something 
embedded in the organization’s daily life is, we believe, potentially useful in the articulation between 
foresight and organizational “firefighting” (Weick 1996). Empowering organizational members with 
the responsibility to detect and deal with weak signals through legitimate improvisation in their area 
of expertise, may contribute to avoid the kind of culture that might precipitate the deliberate 
ignorance of warning signals. To accept that surprises should be accommodated throughout the 
organization and managed, to a certain degree, in an emergent rather than centralized fashion, 
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means that change and adaptivity should be regarded not as an exceptional state driven from the 
top, but as the normal state of socio-economic systems, which results from multiple interactions 
that cross the several layers of the organization (Tsoukas and Chia 2002).        
 
In this article we have argued that it is not enough to detect weak signals leading to potential wild 
cards: it is also necessary to act upon them. Improvisation, through the application of locally-
sensitive adaptations of recommended tactics, may play a role in the process. This paper aimed to 
make such role more explicit.             
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